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Market Power and Structural Adjustment: 
The Case of West African Cocoa Market Liberalization 
 
Abstract 
Liberalization of the cocoa market in West Africa, due to structural adjustment reforms, 
has resulted in the elimination of para-statal marketing boards and initiated the creation of new 
institutions to replace the marketing services of those agencies. Concerns have been raised as to 
the effects of these reforms on prices of cocoa received by farmers, welfare measures and 
competitiveness of marketing channels. Of particular importance is backward integration of 
multinational processing firms, who take over exporting activities and may collect rents 
previously captured as export taxes. This paper uses a conjectural variations approach to estimate 
the degree of market power present in the post-liberalized cocoa bean markets of Ivory Coast and 
Nigeria. Evidence of market power is found in the Ivory Coast markets between the farmgate and 
U.S./EU15 imports. The market power, exercised by multinational exporter/processors, must be 
considered in concert with the Ivorian government who is still collecting export taxes. In 
contrast, no evidence of market power is found in the Nigerian markets or domestic (farmer to 
trader) markets of Ivory Coast. 
 Market Power and Structural Adjustment: 




Historically, the incomes of West African smallholder cocoa farmers were determined by 
state-controlled entities. These para-statal marketing agencies set prices and marketing margins, 
and intervened in input markets, procurement of cocoa and subsequent export. Mandated 
farmgate prices aimed to protect the farmers from world price volatility while the taxes levied on 
cocoa exports were an important source of foreign exchange and government revenue. Recent 
liberalization of these markets, due to structural adjustment reforms, has resulted in the 
elimination of para-statals and created the need for new private institutions and market agents to 
replace the services of those government agencies (Bloomfield and Lass, 1992; Varangis and 
Schreiber, 2001). Initially, chaotic markets characterized by entry of many exporters emerged 
(Gilbert, 1997), but recently multinational cocoa bean processors took over exporting as well as 
processing and are backward integrating into domestic links of the cocoa supply chain. 
The main objective of cocoa market liberalization in West Africa was to ensure greater 
‘pass-though’ of the world price to the farmer and to tie the dynamics of the entire chain to world 
market forces in an effort to improve efficiency (Gilbert and Varangis, 2003). However, if 
imperfectly competitive agents with market power replace para-statals this may widen the 
previously large gap between the farmgate price and the price received for exported beans in 
EU15 and the United States, as agents in a long supply chain reap rents that previously accrued 
to the government as taxes. This has arguably left farmers at the mercy of both the unstable 
world market and concentrated multinational corporations, leading to concerns as to the effects 
of structural adjustment reforms (Gilbert, 1997; McIntire and Varangis, 1999; Gilbert and 
Varangis, 2003; Dorin, 2003).  2 
Nigeria and Ivory Coast provide an interesting juxtaposition. As the earliest (1986) and 
most recent (1999) cocoa market liberalizers, respectively, they provide an opportunity to 
examine market power issues as they evolve over time. Institutional differences across these 
countries suggest the possibility of very different outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to 
estimate the degree of oligopsony power that may exist in post-liberalized Ivory Coast and 
Nigeria at various points along the cocoa supply chain. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides background related to cocoa market 
structure. Section II examines literature regarding structural adjustment as it pertains to cocoa 
market liberalization, emphasizing the role of backward integrating multinationals. Section III 
describes the theoretical approach adopted in this study. Section IV describes the model and data 
used in econometric estimations. Results are explained in Section V and concluding remarks are 
provided in Section VI. 
 
I. Background on cocoa market structure 
Cocoa beans are a perennial tree crop grown in tropical climates, with over 66% 
produced by smallholder farmers in West Africa (ICCO, 2003). Ivory Coast leads all countries 
with approximately 35 percent of total world production while Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon 
accounted for 13%, 12% and 4%, respectively. Cocoa plays an important role in these African 
economies as a main export good and source of foreign exchange. In addition, smallholder 
farmers (< 5 hectares) typically grow this cocoa, which generates work opportunities for an 
estimated 10.5 million Africans (ICCO, 2003). The beans are fermented and dried in their 
country of origin. Though some producing countries have begun to process their own beans, the 
bulk of production is shipped to processors in Europe and North America who roast beans and  3  
grind them into liquor. Liquor can be used directly in the manufacture of chocolate or is further 
processed, through pressing, into butter and powder. The vast majority of finished products that 
contain cocoa are consumed in Europe and North America. 
In the past, producers from the main cocoa producing African countries participated in a 
system where para-statals controlled farmgate prices, input supply and all levels of marketing, 
research and extension (Dand, 1999; Fold, 2002). The French and English influences from their 
colonial past led each country to follow either a Caisse de Stabilisation or marketing board 
approach, respectively. The marketing boards in Ghana and Nigeria controlled all aspects of the 
cocoa marketing chain by setting the f.o.b. price in the preseason, and by declaring producer 
prices, buyer’s margins, transportation costs and export taxes. The marketing boards also 
performed all the related tasks including inspections, buying, loading, transportation, quality 
control, storage and export. The Caisse, in Ivory Coast and Cameroon, on the other hand, was 
not directly involved with the transportation of cocoa from the farmgate (controlled by private 
traders called traitants ) and permitted ‘private’ exporters to operate within a system of quotas 
(Losch, 2002), and regulated farm gate as well as export prices, while collecting substantial 
taxes.   
Nigeria was the first West African cocoa producer to liberalize (in 1986), with reforms 
from the producer and input level through the marketing chain to exporting the beans. Currently, 
Ghana is the last country to retain its marketing board and other portions of its para-statal 
apparatus, having undergone partial reforms beginning in the 1992/93 season, while Cameroon 
and Ivory Coast began the liberalization process in 1991 and 1999, respectively (ICCO, 2003). 
The specific impacts of liberalization have been particular to each country, though marketing 
chain composition (via concentration) has been affected to some degree without exception.  4  
Cameroon has eliminated export taxes and promoted ‘cooperation’ between Cameroonian 
exporters and multinational firms. Ivory Coast has restructured its taxation regime, eliminated 
the Caisse de Stabilisation, and allowed some backward integration by the market’s new entrants 
– the multinational firms. Ghana has allowed the creation of quasi-private exporting firms but the 
marketing board structure remains largely intact. Less is known about Nigeria, the first to 
liberalize, but there are reports that it has the most competitive cocoa sector since many local 
exporters are still warehousing and exporting independent of the multinationals that are also 
present (Dand, 1999). 
The use of market power has a long history in cocoa markets, as quotas as well as 
implicit and explicit tax schemes have been implemented by para-statals (Panagariya and Schiff, 
1992). The export tax intervenes between the producer and world price and may be set 
‘optimally’ as governments take advantage of their nation’s relatively large world market share. 
The optimal tax is a function of interactions among and conjectures about the other major 
producing countries in addition to residual demand and supply elasticities (Yilmaz, 1999). The 
tax wedge generates revenue to the government which is theoretically redistributed to the 
population. A goal of structural adjustment has been elimination of these taxes due in part to 
inefficiencies and corruption in redistribution.  
The current structure of the marketing chain in Ivory Coast is diagramed in Figure 1 
(adapted from Sanogo, 2002). Markets in other West African countries exhibit small variations. 
As shown, it provides the cocoa farmer with two basic options: sell their product to pisteurs (up-
country agents) and so traitants or to cooperatives. According to the Bureau d’Etudes Techniques 
et de Dévelopement (BNETD), the market share enjoyed by cooperatives has decreased from 
32% during the 1998/99 season to 18% in the post-liberalization season of 2000/01 leaving  5  
almost 80% to be funneled through middlemen (BNTED, 2002). Once the cocoa arrives at the 
port of Abidjan or San Pedro, it is conditioned for export (usinage) and shipped to processors 
largely by multinational exporters who, in the cases of Archers Daniels Midland (ADM), Cargill 
and Barry Callebaut, are themselves processors. Therefore the farmgate price is now the residual 
of the ‘c.i.f.’ (EU15/ U.S.) price less transportation, conditioning, taxes and other associated 
marketing costs which may include rents to exporters. This is in contrast with pre-liberalization 
where the farmgate price was mandated and rents were collected exclusively by the government. 
A survey of reports shows how multinational exporter market share has evolved since 
liberalization in Ivory Coast (Table 1). Immediately after liberalization was implemented in 
Ivory Coast, the nation’s largest exporter/processor was Sifca-Jag with almost a 20% market 
share while at the same time ADM had put a partial takeover of Sifca into motion. Overall, 
fourteen firms controlled three-quarters of the cocoa that was declared for export in 99/00 (the 
cocoa season traditionally begins in October and some data include bean equivalents as several 
exporters process a small portion of Ivorian output in-country). These fourteen firms now control 
upwards of 85% of the export market, with almost 90% during the 2001/02 season. Currently, 
though there are 61 exporters, the top five firms control roughly half of the total exports. 
According to the calculated Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Table 1), the equivalent number of 
symmetric firms ranges from 10.9 in 2000 to 13.8 in 2003.  
Unfortunately, these reports only allow one to discern the nominal ownership of cocoa 
exporters while anecdotal information leads us to believe that several smaller companies are 
acting on behalf of the larger exporters, and there are allegations of overlapping ownership. 
Moreover, the project funding this research (STCP) has worked with cooperatives who are 
developing partnerships with the multinational exporter/processors, including cooperatives who  6  
are acting as their own exports, but contract for services (usinage, transportation, warehousing, 
port handling) from the multinational exporters. This practice allows the multinationals to realize 
economies of scale beyond what is possible under regulations limiting the market share of 
exporters, while the cooperatives also bear the price risk of these export transactions. 
 
II. Research Specific to Market Power and Cocoa Market Liberalization 
Fold (2002) and Losch (2002) both provide insight into how the market structure of West 
African cocoa (Ghana and Ivory Coast, respectively) has changed and may further change due to 
liberalization. Both authors provide anecdotal evidence supporting the possibility that 
liberalization resulted in backward integration by the multinational grinders and subsequent 
market power exertion.  
Currently, the consolidation of exporters across countries is to the point where, 
cumulatively, multinationals have cocoa bean market shares that almost rival Ivory Coast itself 
(Fold, 2002 and Losch, 2002). The ‘oligopolistic’ countries have been replaced by a few 
multinationals that may be better prepared to use their market power, to achieve different 
objectives. In the past, major cocoa producers with aims of exercising market power (i.e. Ivory 
Coast) were thwarted by non-cooperation and limited by in-country storage capacity due to 
climatic conditions. Coordinated international efforts have also been attempted in the form of 
four separate international commodity agreements in an effort to stabilize market prices, but 
these quotas or stock schemes all failed (Maizels, 1997). In contrast, as the multinational 
processors backward integrated, they have also made efforts to integrate forward as the primary 
chocolate manufacturers were restructuring and willingly sold their processing capacity to the 
processors. Some processors are also entering the chocolate manufacturing business. The take  7  
home message is that liberalization opened up the export market to private multinational 
corporations that have incentives to vertically integrate in an effort to promote cost savings 
through efficiency gains and possibly to exert market power against smallholder farmers, 
chocolate manufacturers, and consumers.  
Gilbert (1997) examines the possible effects of liberalization on farmgate prices and the 
resulting farm income. While exchange rate and inflation issues may dampen the usefulness of 
cross-country comparisons, liberalized markets (at the time Nigeria and Cameroon) resulted in 
farmers receiving a larger share of the f.o.b. price. Gilbert notes that export taxes may lower after 
liberalization but are not necessarily eliminated. And the narrower margins could also reflect 
greater competition along the supply chain. 
Gilbert and Varangis (2003) discuss how liberalization opens the marketing chain to 
world price volatility and that export taxes will have less of an impact on farmgate prices. This, 
coupled with the market share enjoyed by countries like Ivory Coast and Ghana, may result in 
supply shifts that have large country implications on price: lower prices as output expands, so 
farmers will have a larger share of the lower price. The origin of this result was the ‘adding up’ 
effect, due to inelastic world demand and elastic farmer supply. The authors contend that 
producers will see some welfare gain if export tax revenue is redistributed and that foreign 
consumers of cocoa products will be the only ‘clear winners’ as the world price of cocoa falls.   
McIntire and Varangis (1999) analyze the reforms undertaken by Ivory Coast early in the 
liberalization process. Ivory Coast’s pricing policies and marketing strategies were examined in a 
general equilibrium framework. They concluded that the government did not manage farm price 
stabilization programs effectively under the caisse system and that under the new liberalization 
scheme farm prices should rise, along with rural incomes, by lowering the export tax. They  8  
found that lowering the export tax would have a slight negative effect on national income, but 
trying to raise the tax to ‘optimal’ levels may have deleterious effects on Ivory Coast’s market 
share. Improving the efficiency of the marketing chain through competition and raising the 
minimum producer price (which had since been eliminated and then reinstituted ineffectively in 
2003) should also promote income gains.  
Dorin (2003) took a value sharing approach to establish how the current move toward 
liberalization in Ivory Coast has changed the environment in which the producers, governments, 
processors and manufacturers operate. He notes that export taxes have fluctuated from a pre-
liberalization level of 36% of the c.i.f. price in 1996/97 to 19% in 1998/99 and now rest between 
25 and 29%. Looking at data from 1992 to 2001 covering all levels of value from farmgate to 
French chocolate tablet, he concludes that the gains and losses imply bilateral market power 
exertion by multinational processors.  
The common thread has been the increased importance of multinational firms.  Fold 
(2002), Losch (2002) and Dorin (2003) discuss market power within the newly liberalized 
markets, focusing on the new role of multinationals. Their insights provide a basis upon which 
we use economic theory and data to uncover evidence, if any, of the exertion of market power in 
the marketing chain from farm-level cocoa procurement to the exporter selling the beans. The 
major drawback to this literature is the lack of attention paid to measuring the extent of market 
power in the cocoa marketing chain, and its quantitative effects on market outcomes. And none 
of these studies takes into consideration the fact that the marketing chain itself may completely 
alter the outcomes and policy prescriptions of their models due to the presence of market power 
in both domestic and international links.   9  
This paper attempts to resolve this issue on the extent of market power exercised by 
multinational cocoa exporter/processors after liberalization. New Empirical Industrial 
Organization type estimations will explicitly test for market power and estimate markup/downs 
due to those rents.  
 
III. Estimation of Market Power 
Market power issues in the agricultural sector have received increasing attention as firms 
in the United States and European Union consolidate throughout the marketing chain (Sexton 
and Zhang, 2001; McCorriston, 2002). While consolidation itself does not automatically 
predestine a sector to imperfect competition, it is an often cited characteristic that may increase 
the incidence of market power within the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm 
(Carlton and Perloff, 1994). The demand and supply dimensions of agricultural goods also may 
lead to imperfect competition. For example, the nature of raw agricultural products (bulky, 
perishable, limited substitutability, etc.) and their production (economies of scale, exit barriers, 
etc.) creates opportunities for firms to exert market power on the demand and supply side, 
respectively (Sexton and Zhang, 2001). Imperfect competition in the trade of agricultural goods 
is driven by factors such as increasing returns, intra-firm trade and market structure (Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985).  
The vast majority of work in the field of market power and the agricultural sector has 
focused on estimating the degree of market power in processing, manufacturing and retail 
(Sexton and Lavoie, 2001).  An early contribution by Appelbaum (1982) looks beyond the SCP 
paradigm and introduces a model framework that builds on the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) paradigm. NEIO relies on game theory and econometrics to find evidence  10 
of market power by using price and quantity data for individual industries (Sexton, 2000; Carlton 
and Perloff, 1994). Much of this work has been done using a conjectural variations approach that 
incorporates a firm’s belief about how rivals will react to their output choice within a static 
framework. That approach, as proposed by Appelbaum (1982) for the monopoly case, will be 
modified here to accommodate the oligopsony case following Schroeter (1988) and to examine 
intermediaries.  
 
IV. Description of the Model 
As described previously, the generic cocoa marketing chain consists of agents that 
facilitate the movement of cocoa from the growing areas to the ports where the beans are 
conditioned and shipped. Farmers in each country are assumed to produce homogenous products. 
These producers are assumed to behave as competitive agents who simply satisfy demand at 
prices which they take as given. Agents demanding cocoa beans from the farmer will be either be 
traitants, who earn the prevailing prix entrée usine (price received prior to conditioning by 
traitants) less fixed marginal costs and the farmgate price, or exporters who receive the c.i.f. 
price (unit import value) less export taxes, fixed marginal costs and the farmgate price. Potential 
agents who could exercise market power are the government via continued export taxes, 
exporters/processors, and even the local traitants. These are intermediaries along a chain who 
buy from farmers (or traitants in one variant) and sell to processors in Europe and North 
America. Our basic model, modified to treat each potential agent, describes the behavior of an 
intermediary with potential market power both up and down stream. An exporter is typical, and 
the agent most likely to exercise market power. 
  11 
Theory 
An exporting firm j’s problem is to choose the profit (Π) maximizing amount of cocoa 
beans qij in month i to buy/sell given farmer supply, processor/chocolate manufacturer demand, 
and conjectured responses by rival firms: 
 Max ( ) ( )
ij
ij i ii j i ii j ij q P Qq rQq c q ∏= − −      (1) 
where Pi is the nominal price at which the beans are sold by firm j in month i and ri is the 
farmgate price for beans in month i - both are functions of overall aggregate demand by the 
exporting sector (Q). The last term, c, represents the fixed marginal cost associated with cocoa 
bean procurement by the exporting firm. These costs may include: conditioning at the port, 
transportation from farm to port or port to port as well as other costs of doing business such as 
non-export tax fees to the government. The first order conditions for profit maximization are: 
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where  ∂Qi/∂qij is the effect of this firm’s behavior on industry quantity, Q, based on the 
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where Θ represents the industry level conjectural elasticity, η  the own price elasticity of demand, 
ε the own price elasticity of supply and nk  is the equivalent number of symmetric firms in a 
given season k, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculated from export declarations 
data (Table 1).   12 
As with many other NEIO studies, firm level data is not available so industry level data is 
used here. Appelbaum considered θ
j to be a benchmark estimate of the oligopolisitic power of 
firm j. This could be used to test the hypotheses that θ
j =0, the behavior of the firm (which is an 
oligopoly by assumption) is described by perfect competition, or θ
j=1 where the firm behavior is 
characterized by pure monopoly. Schroeter extends this definition to describe behavior in the 
factor markets as well and observes that θ
j is the j
th firm’s perceived rate of change (as an 
elasticity) of aggregate market output (factor demands) with respect to the firm’s output (factor 
demands) in the monopoly (monopsony) case. In order to implement their theoretical framework 
at the industry level, these views of θ
j required that marginal cost (cj = c) was constant and shared 
common values across symmetric firms, and therefore θ
j= Θ. In other words, all of the firms 
would act with the same degree of market power, so ∂Qi/∂qij = Θ for all j. This assumption on 
Schroeter’s intermediary case also implied that the firm’s behavior was the same in both the 
output and factor markets (as implemented above, a result of Leontief cost function restrictions 
used to resolve indeterminacy of upstream versus downstream behavior). While this assumption 
is appropriate given the prevailing technology and available data, this limits our ability to 
attribute any evidence of profit taking to the exporter/processor’s relative ability to markup the 
price against agents upstream versus markdown prices received by farmers or traders depending 
on which input price is considered. In our case, this could be resolved if we had greater 
confidence in the constant elasticity assumption used to derive (3) and the specific elasticities we 
needed to assume (η and ε). 
Both authors use the estimated Θ to calculate price distortions in the output (and input in 
Schroeter’s case) market as measured by Lerner’s index (and its factor market analog). In 
contrast to Appelbaum and Schroeter, markup/down is quantified here by subtracting off all costs  13 
incurred by the firm (taxes, and estimated fixed marginal (c) and input costs) leaving the residual 
rent. A percent markup/down is then measured as rent relative to the output price average from 
the sample.  
For the purposes of both theoretical derivation and estimation in this paper, cocoa beans 
are assumed purchased by the exporting firm and sold exclusively in the EU15 and the United 
States. Consumption in the producing country is considered negligible as is any processing of the 
beans.  
Cocoa beans are a perishable crop that requires handling that is beyond the typical 
smallholder’s capability. Cocoa is usually marketed within a month after on-farm harvest and 
conditioning (drying and fermentation). Cocoa is also a seasonal crop that is harvested in the 
greatest amounts between October and March (the main crop) and to a lesser extent during April 
through June (the mid-crop). Cocoa is observed on the world market during the months of July 
through September, but this is usually from stores held by traders and processors, not farmers. 
Since transactions along the making chain can take several weeks to complete, due to 
transportation and conditioning tasks, the input price in the current and lagged period are 
weighted in the optimality condition and these econometrically estimated weights sum to one. 
This accounts for delivery lags and possible short term storage by traders and exporters in the 
empirical implementation of the model. 
The optimality condition (3) includes three unknown parameters, Θ,  η , and ε  which 
cannot be identified from linear estimation of that equation. Estimates of the necessary short run 
elasticities could be obtained from the literature or from demand and supply functions that are 
estimated simultaneously with the optimality condition. The former approach was chosen, so we 
estimate only Θ from the single optimality condition for Ivory Coast and Nigeria given η  and ε.  14 
As a perennial tree crop, estimating a cocoa supply function should take into 
consideration farmer’s tree planting decisions, the delayed maturation of the tree (most types do 
not bear fruit for up to 3 -5 years), and the farmer’s management strategies based on their 
expectations for the present and future seasons. The original work on cocoa supply response in 
Ghana was done by Bateman (1965). Bateman based aggregate supply response on an iterative 
model that incorporated the choice of the Ghanaian farmers to plant cocoa (a perennial tree crop) 
and the ensuing management. Since his ‘technological capacity’ approach was introduced, 
several researchers have attempted to improve on its basic design and implementation by adding 
lagged dependent and independent variables, introduction of competing crops to capture the 
dynamic effects of competing uses of labor, planting decisions and an examination of longer 
term elasticities (see Akiyama and Trivedi, 1987 for a review). A common thread in these studies 
is the use of annual data that is often problematic due to lack of confidence in its compilation.  
In this study we attempted to use both annual and available monthly, post-liberalization 
data to estimate the necessary short run supply elasticity ε. All attempts were met with failure, 
reflecting strong upwards trends in supply in Ivory Coast in the face of declining world and 
farmgate cocoa prices. Lack of appropriate monthly data precluded us from trying the same 
estimation of the short run, own-price elasticity of demand, η .  Therefore, we set the  short run 
supply elasticity ε  as 0.2, as a consensus result from available recent prior estimates (Gilbert and 
Varangis, 2003; Labys, 1973), and set η   at -0.3 based on ICCO estimates of the short run 
demand for chocolate (ICCO, 2004). Since we are estimating a monthly model we erred on the 
low side in choosing these parameters, reflecting what we believe are limited very short run 
alternatives available to farmers, traders and even exporters. Sensitivity analysis, by varying  15 
these elasticities, generated proportional changes in estimates of Θ without changing results or 
significance on tests of market power. 
 
Data 
The econometric approach to the estimation of market power is often data intensive and 
data limitation issues can be a problem. Data were collected from a variety of sources. All 
analyses for Ivory Coast covered monthly data from October 1999 to February 2003 with data 
from July through September omitted due to lack of information (these months represent 
transactions that are comprised of primarily beans stored by the traders and/or exporters so this 
should not significantly affect the results concerning the farmer’s direct interactions with the 
agents upstream). Nigerian data was available on a monthly basis from January 1997 to June 
2002. All months were included in the Nigerian data set. Import unit values were used to 
represent the price received by the exporter. These were calculated by summing the quantity (in 
metric tons) and value (in nominal US$) of exports to the EU and US and dividing quantity by 
value for that month. These unit values are taken to represent the price at which the exporting 
firm can sell their beans in the overseas markets. This c.i.f. price includes the export tax levied 
on exporters by the government of Ivory Coast. Therefore, a time series of export taxes (DUS) 
was collected from the Observatoire (BNETD, various years) and Factiva and subtracted from 
the unit values in instances where the aim was to determine whether the Ivory Coast 
government’s actions were actually influencing the results on exporter behavior.  
Farmgate prices for 1997 to June 2002 in Nigeria are reported as monthly averages by the 
Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (US-FAS, 2004) 
through the US Embassy in semi-annual Attaché Reports. Farmgate price and prix entrée usine  16 
data for Ivory Coast from October 1999 to June 2001 were obtained from the BNTED (various 
years). The remaining prices, from October 2001 to June 2003 were monthly averages calculated 
from weekly observations through Factiva (Dow Jones Commodity Wire or Reuters). Ivory Coast 
reports weekly farmer prices from up to 6 different buying stations so an average price, weighted 
by annual production in each area, was used. For use in the estimation of market power against 
farmers by traders, the prices were left in local currency per metric ton. When used in the 
optimality condition, the farmgate price was converted to US$/mt using monthly exchange 
conversion rates from DataStream. 
Figures 2 and 3 present data used in regressions to test for market power in Ivory Coast 
and Nigeria. For world prices, they include import unit values as well as the ICCO price, an 
average of NYBOT and LIFFE commodity exchange prices. These data show that unit values are 
a good approximation of world cocoa prices and that farmgate and trader prices follow with 
similar patterns but exhibit a substantial margin which could be attributed to market power. 
 
V: Regression Results 
Ivory Coast 
Five separate regressions were performed for Ivory Coast.  The optimality condition (3) 
was used to examine transactions between farmers and exporters as well as between traders and 
exporters, both with and without the export tax wedge imposed by the government (Table 2). 
The final regression examined the interaction between farmers and traitants (traders). In each 
case an intermediary with potential market power faced differing upstream and downstream 
prices, so supply and demand functions.  17 
Wald tests were performed to test the hypothesis that the conjectural elasticity, Θ, was 
equal to zero, at a 1% significance level. In other words, the Wald test provides evidence on 
whether the conjectural elasticity truly represents perfect competition or a departure manifested 
as oligopoly/oligopsony power exerted by the intermediary in the marketing chain.  
The first cases examine whether a combination of the government and exporters exert 
market power. An initial perspective of this case would be that export taxes are simply an 
exogenous cost of doing business to multinationals, so implicitly in c. In each case perfect 
competition is rejected, and markups/downs range from 36.5% to 24.6%, depending on whether 
farmgate or trader prices are used, and whether delivery lags are considered. These results are 
consistent with a reluctant sharing of market power between the government, who continues to 
tax exports, and the multinationals. Subsequent results suggest the government still sees and 
seeks to exploit market power, but that it is now shared with the multinationals. News reports on 
“debate between the government and trader organizations” as export taxes are adjusted when 
world market prices change are consistent with this view of bilateral market power. 
The next case considers a multinational intermediary only, by eliminating export taxes 
from the c.i.f. prices received by exporters, to determine if exporters exercise market power once 
the influence of government is removed. In two of those three cases significant market power is 
found. Markups/downs range from 20% to 8.9%. The smallest markup and insignificance on 
market power is found when trader rather than farmer prices are used, and when delivery lags are 
not considered. This last specification was tried because the period weights were not significant 
in the regression applying delivery lags. This result is ambiguous, but strongly suggestive of 
market power in the hands of exporters. It may reflect some sharing of rents with traders (a likely 
outcome given institutional arrangements permitting collusion via partnerships between  18 
exporters and some large traders as well as cooperatives). That these markups are less than those 
found when the government is included indicate that some degree of market power remains in 
the hands of government as they adjust export taxes. 
Though anecdotal reports have claimed that traitants exert market power on farmers, this 
effect is not captured when one considers the farmgate to trader margin. It appears that there may 
be a slight markdown against farmers of 1.1%. However, exertion of market power is not 
suggested by the conjectural elasticity, which is not significantly different from zero. Another 
explanation may be that it is pisteurs who exert market power over remote, isolated farmers, and 
that market power does not show up in these farmgate prices measured at buying centers. 
 
Nigeria 
Regression results for Nigeria were inconclusive as the conjectural elasticity was 
estimated to be a theoretically impossible -0.0223 and yet significant at the 5% level. Upon 
further examination, the source of this confounding result is evident in the data. Farmgate prices, 
converted to thousands of US$ per metric ton at official exchange rates are higher than the 
prevailing export price for several monthly observations, including rather long continuous 
periods. Several authors have noted that this is likely the result of exporters using cocoa as a 
source of foreign exchange in a country where inflation has been considerable and whose 
currency suffers from convertibility issues and is likely substantially overvalued (Gilbert, 1997; 
Dand, 1999; Varangis and Schreiber, 2001). Thus, exporters may be able to convert currency on 
a black market for foreign exchange to cover these apparent losses. We are searching for black 
market exchange rates for Nigeria to get a better handle on this issue.  19 
Anecdotal information, in the form of news reports, indicates that the Nigerian export 
market is relatively competitive and multinationals have not grown a foothold in this market (as 
compared to Ivory Coast). Reported farmgate prices follow closely world prices, and are much 
closer in level to those prices. Recent reports of farmers hoarding cocoa for short period of time 
and banding together to refute advertised farmgate prices together with these results indicate that 
liberalization may not have wrought market power. But the foreign exchange constraints may 
confound this interpretation, and lead to a different conclusion about the success of reforms in 
this market. 
 
VI: Concluding Remarks 
These results strongly suggest that there is exercise of market power along the cocoa 
supply chain in Ivory Coast. It appears that the government continues to extract rents from its 
large world market share, but following liberalization those rents are shared with multinational 
exporters. The markups that include export taxes range from 30 to 36%. These are ominously 
similar to optimal export taxes estimated by Yilmaz and more importantly to actual export taxes 
charged by the Ivory Coast government prior to structural reforms. While the results which seek 
to isolate market power of the multinational exporters are strongly suggestive that market power 
is exerted, how that is shared between the government and local traders is uncertain, and needs 
further sorting out. There is little evidence of local traders exercising market power against 
farmers, although they may be colluding with exporters in some instances, and market power 
against remote farmers would not be found in this data. 
Results for Nigeria are consistent with perfect competition among intermediaries there. 
But foreign exchange issues suggest that future work is needed on the role of black markets for  20 
foreign exchange, and the cost of an overvalued currency to farmers. Traders in Nigeria may be 
primarily in the foreign exchange business, with cocoa as a side enterprise to generate foreign 
exchange. 
The exercise of market power, whether directly against farmers or upstream by exporters, 
increases the margin between farmgate prices and prices paid by consumers and chocolate 
manufacturers. Farm income would be higher if these markets were more competitive. Changes 
in institutional structures are needed to bring greater pass-through of chocolate prices to farmers. 
Institutional innovations of antiquated supply chain links may also reduce transactions costs 
currently contributing to low farm income. 
Further research should be conducted where the optimality condition is specified in such 
a way that the conjectural elasticity can vary depending on month or season in an attempt to 
determine how these agents interact throughout the year. Farmer – trader interaction will require 
a more precise dataset that has the actual price that individual farmers and traders receive. A 
more robust cross-sectional dataset will be needed to tease a better picture of what is really 
occurring in these markets. Certainly other countries should be analyzed as data becomes 
available (Cameroon for instance), to better asses the effectiveness of reforms. Processor’s 
interactions with chocolate manufacturers in the retail sector should also be examined in order to 
paint a clearer picture of total industry performance.  21 
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